Afghan politics are fast-paced and slow at the same time; often more smoke than fire, but unpredictable enough to keep everyone on their toes and to keep the political class engaged in endless cycles of meetings. The chatter is a steady hum on the background of whatever is going on in the country. In insecure times it goes into overdrive, feeding existing speculations and suspicions, and suggesting imminent crisis. Because nerves have already been strained for quite a while, the narratives are becoming increasingly imaginative and complicated.
It is a highly dynamic process. People meet, talk, speculate and plot. They are gauging the mood, swapping conspiracy theories, forging alliances, provoking divisions, calling in favours, spreading stories, persuading, enlisting, floating ideas, reporting back (often embellishing) on what others said or what they are planning, and exaggerating one’s own ability to deliver this person or that outcome. Most conversations are preliminary, explorative and lead to nothing. But how to be sure.
So rumours of meetings lead to more nervous meetings (so-and-so are gathering, they must be planning something; I feel weakened, my enemies must be after me; if they are ganging up, who can I mobilise; if I tell this-and-them that so-and-so is plotting, maybe they will finally act against him; if I talk up my support, they can neither hurt nor ignore me, etc.). Insecure times are rife with half-true, half-baseless reports of highly worrying developments. This is definitely what we are seeing now.
Much of the current political discomfort has its origins in the deterioration of relations between the US and President Karzai, and the political repositioning and jockeying that came with that. It led the President to believe that the proceedings of the presidential election – and to a certain extent the 2010 parliamentary election – were a blatant attempt by the international community to remove him, undermine him or intimidate him into submission. It is a feeling that has never left him and that allows him to believe the foreigners may be behind a whole host of misfortunes that is hitting his country and his family. It also persuaded him that he needed back-up plans and alternatives in terms of allies and benefactors. This combination of dependence and paranoia is an important driver for the mixed messages that come from the palace.
There is, as a result, a general sense of being in flux, which has been exacerbated by a wave of more recent incidents and developments: the string of assassinations that targeted high-profile officials in their own compounds; the wide-ranging speculations over which hidden hands are behind the killings (leading to new narratives over who is to be feared); all the talk about secret talks, coupled with long-standing suspicions that the war may really just be a cruel game; the complicated American message that while they have no interest in staying, they will not abandon the Afghans again (both of which are being simultaneously disbelieved); regular media reports that seem to suggest extensive presence and interference by foreign intelligence agencies (see for instance recent articles here, here andhere), which fuel the growing distrust of the ‘real objectives’ of the foreigners that are here; the looming deadline of 2014 and the increasing expectations of what the second Bonn conference might mean for the Afghan political set-up. There is obviously a lot to talk about.
This has led to roughly three strands of concerns. First, there is a strong sense of foreboding among large parts of the population that the ‘transition’, whatever form it may take, will ultimately result in a combination of the rule of the rough (the violent, the uneducated, the exploitative, the over-conservative) and a general unraveling. Over the years the wish to leave the country, or to send children abroad, has risen and waned. At the moment it is at a peak again and many are trying to prepare their exit, in case they may need it.
Second, there is the heightened sense of alarm among those prominent enough to be singled out in acts of targeting or revenge. It has led many of the former commanders to limit their movements, increase their personal security, be suspicious of formal meetings and meetings with foreign military, and carry a weapon at all times (which in turn is accelerating the ongoing (para-)militarization of Afghan society). The string of killings looks to them like an intentional reshuffling of the cards and many of them fear they may be next. Initially the high-profile killings mainly concerned former Jamiat-linked commanders (Kandahar police chief Khan Mohammad, Kunduz police chief Mowlana Seidkheili, Northern Zone police commander Daoud Daoud), but the recent assassinations of Ahmed Wali Karzai and Jan Mohammad have widened the scope of the targeting.
There are various ways to look at this. One is that the Taleban, in response to the fierce Special Forces ‘kill/capture (mainly kill) campaign’, have launched their own targeting campaign, in an effort to hit their opponents where it hurts. But it is unlikely that the Taleban are doing this on their own, given the high-level of inside facilitation that is needed to be able to come that close, that often. At least two commanders (Khan Mohammad and Ahmad Wali Karzai) were killed by people whom they had known and relied on for years.* Although the Taleban have put much effort into infiltration and recruitment, there is a growing conviction that something else is going on. Several interlocutors have commented that they believe the Taleban may increasingly be offering or facilitating attackers to be used by anyone with a grudge or an enemy they want to take care of.
Former factions now believe they are increasingly being targeted by old enemies in a process of political repositioning. But behind that many suspect the looming presence of foreign interference. This is illustrated in the comments by presidential spokesman Waheed Omar’s immediately after General Daoud’s killing: “No one from Afghanistan carries out attacks. Everything shows that they are shaped outside Afghanistan. The President of Afghanistan says these are foreign forces. We will continue the war against terrorists who are foreigners. He is asking for your patience.” And yesterday, Ustad Rabbani, currently the head of the High Peace Council, was quoted by Tolo saying that “the assassination of high-profile Afghan figures is part of a plot sketched by foreign intelligence organisations to misuse the name of the Taliban and to defame Islam.”**
The conspiracy theories are not new, but they seem to be gaining traction in unprecedented ways, with the ‘West’ often being mentioned before even Pakistan. The killings are in this view alternately seen as an effort to weaken the President so that he is obliged to agree to US demands (in particular long-term bases); an indication that Westerners have run out of patience and are taking out those whom they had blacklisted long ago; or – an old suspicion – part of an effort to intentionally prolong the war for their own reasons.
A former commander, now politician, recently took this view to its extreme: “If you want I can easily arrange a few suicide bombers to hit someone. It is very easy. The Taleban have become like a shop with different clients. And they have clients from three sides: Pakistan, the West – and when I say the West I don’t mean Europe, except of course England – and India, to hit Pakistan… Basically people think you [foreigners/Westerners] have instructed and paid the Taleban to do these latest attacks.” (Internationals would be wise not to brush such views aside too lightly. The fact that they do not seem that outlandish to many of the Afghans we speak to, illustrates the ever widening gap in how this conflict is viewed).
The third concern is the concern of the government – or rather: the concentric rings formed first by the President, second his various entourages, and third the wider political elite of those who have allowed themselves to be coopted. It centres on the fear of being outshone and replaced by other persons or groups, who may manage to capture the favour of the increasingly impatient international community. It builds on the assumption that the internationals may one day pick a new leader or ally, if only they can be persuaded that this is in their interest. As a result, opposition discussions are being closely monitored and trusted advisers closely watched.
Critics of President Karzai – whether situated in the formal opposition or within government – are engaged in what you could call an ongoing low-level brainstorm, in which they evaluate whether and when it might be feasible to propose a new political set-up and how to secure international support for the effort. The open opposition – roughly centred around a few key figures, including former NDS chief Amrullah Saleh, former Foreign Minister Dr Abdullah and the more recent coalition made up of Mohaqeq, Dostum and Ahmad Zia Massoud – continues to be preoccupied by their efforts to forge a more united front. Although the uprisings in the Middle East and the symbolic appeal of the upcoming Bonn conference are providing a sense of both opportunity and urgency, so far discussions seem to get stuck in disagreements over who will be (or which group will provide) the main personality that all others are expected to rally around.
The stand-off between the President and Parliament, which is consistently being played down by the Palace, is closely linked to this precarious balance between the government and the opposition. It is a balance in which both sides try to check each other’s influence – without exaggerating and thus possibly provoking a rash reaction from the other side that they may not be able to contain. Every now and then the media singles out some of the rumour and posturing – state of emergency, impeachment,revolt – and reports on it, but for the moment the unraveling does not seem imminent.
* Circumstances suggest that the killing of Ahmad Wali Karzai was not an orchestrated affair, but rather an escalated personal argument over money or a family matter. This, however, becomes largely irrelevant in the context of conspiracy theories.
** The use of the word ‘foreigners’ is conveniently ambiguous, as it can cover both the regional neighbours, most prominently Pakistan, as well as the US-led international coalition, and suggests that secretive ‘hidden hands’ are at work. Although politicians and spokespersons may point the finger at foreigners while knowing better, either to deflect scrutiny or to arouse emotions, it does seem to increasingly resonate with what their audiences wonder.
Afghan politics are fast-paced and slow at the same time; often more smoke than fire, but unpredictable enough to keep everyone on their toes and to keep the political class engaged in endless cycles of meetings. The chatter is a steady hum on the background of whatever is going on in the country. In insecure times it goes into overdrive, feeding existing speculations and suspicions, and suggesting imminent crisis. Because nerves have already been strained for quite a while, the narratives are becoming increasingly imaginative and complicated.
It is a highly dynamic process. People meet, talk, speculate and plot. They are gauging the mood, swapping conspiracy theories, forging alliances, provoking divisions, calling in favours, spreading stories, persuading, enlisting, floating ideas, reporting back (often embellishing) on what others said or what they are planning, and exaggerating one’s own ability to deliver this person or that outcome. Most conversations are preliminary, explorative and lead to nothing. But how to be sure.
So rumours of meetings lead to more nervous meetings (so-and-so are gathering, they must be planning something; I feel weakened, my enemies must be after me; if they are ganging up, who can I mobilise; if I tell this-and-them that so-and-so is plotting, maybe they will finally act against him; if I talk up my support, they can neither hurt nor ignore me, etc.). Insecure times are rife with half-true, half-baseless reports of highly worrying developments. This is definitely what we are seeing now.
Much of the current political discomfort has its origins in the deterioration of relations between the US and President Karzai, and the political repositioning and jockeying that came with that. It led the President to believe that the proceedings of the presidential election – and to a certain extent the 2010 parliamentary election – were a blatant attempt by the international community to remove him, undermine him or intimidate him into submission. It is a feeling that has never left him and that allows him to believe the foreigners may be behind a whole host of misfortunes that is hitting his country and his family. It also persuaded him that he needed back-up plans and alternatives in terms of allies and benefactors. This combination of dependence and paranoia is an important driver for the mixed messages that come from the palace.
There is, as a result, a general sense of being in flux, which has been exacerbated by a wave of more recent incidents and developments: the string of assassinations that targeted high-profile officials in their own compounds; the wide-ranging speculations over which hidden hands are behind the killings (leading to new narratives over who is to be feared); all the talk about secret talks, coupled with long-standing suspicions that the war may really just be a cruel game; the complicated American message that while they have no interest in staying, they will not abandon the Afghans again (both of which are being simultaneously disbelieved); regular media reports that seem to suggest extensive presence and interference by foreign intelligence agencies (see for instance recent articles here, here andhere), which fuel the growing distrust of the ‘real objectives’ of the foreigners that are here; the looming deadline of 2014 and the increasing expectations of what the second Bonn conference might mean for the Afghan political set-up. There is obviously a lot to talk about.
This has led to roughly three strands of concerns. First, there is a strong sense of foreboding among large parts of the population that the ‘transition’, whatever form it may take, will ultimately result in a combination of the rule of the rough (the violent, the uneducated, the exploitative, the over-conservative) and a general unraveling. Over the years the wish to leave the country, or to send children abroad, has risen and waned. At the moment it is at a peak again and many are trying to prepare their exit, in case they may need it.
Second, there is the heightened sense of alarm among those prominent enough to be singled out in acts of targeting or revenge. It has led many of the former commanders to limit their movements, increase their personal security, be suspicious of formal meetings and meetings with foreign military, and carry a weapon at all times (which in turn is accelerating the ongoing (para-)militarization of Afghan society). The string of killings looks to them like an intentional reshuffling of the cards and many of them fear they may be next. Initially the high-profile killings mainly concerned former Jamiat-linked commanders (Kandahar police chief Khan Mohammad, Kunduz police chief Mowlana Seidkheili, Northern Zone police commander Daoud Daoud), but the recent assassinations of Ahmed Wali Karzai and Jan Mohammad have widened the scope of the targeting.
There are various ways to look at this. One is that the Taleban, in response to the fierce Special Forces ‘kill/capture (mainly kill) campaign’, have launched their own targeting campaign, in an effort to hit their opponents where it hurts. But it is unlikely that the Taleban are doing this on their own, given the high-level of inside facilitation that is needed to be able to come that close, that often. At least two commanders (Khan Mohammad and Ahmad Wali Karzai) were killed by people whom they had known and relied on for years.* Although the Taleban have put much effort into infiltration and recruitment, there is a growing conviction that something else is going on. Several interlocutors have commented that they believe the Taleban may increasingly be offering or facilitating attackers to be used by anyone with a grudge or an enemy they want to take care of.
Former factions now believe they are increasingly being targeted by old enemies in a process of political repositioning. But behind that many suspect the looming presence of foreign interference. This is illustrated in the comments by presidential spokesman Waheed Omar’s immediately after General Daoud’s killing: “No one from Afghanistan carries out attacks. Everything shows that they are shaped outside Afghanistan. The President of Afghanistan says these are foreign forces. We will continue the war against terrorists who are foreigners. He is asking for your patience.” And yesterday, Ustad Rabbani, currently the head of the High Peace Council, was quoted by Tolo saying that “the assassination of high-profile Afghan figures is part of a plot sketched by foreign intelligence organisations to misuse the name of the Taliban and to defame Islam.”**
The conspiracy theories are not new, but they seem to be gaining traction in unprecedented ways, with the ‘West’ often being mentioned before even Pakistan. The killings are in this view alternately seen as an effort to weaken the President so that he is obliged to agree to US demands (in particular long-term bases); an indication that Westerners have run out of patience and are taking out those whom they had blacklisted long ago; or – an old suspicion – part of an effort to intentionally prolong the war for their own reasons.
A former commander, now politician, recently took this view to its extreme: “If you want I can easily arrange a few suicide bombers to hit someone. It is very easy. The Taleban have become like a shop with different clients. And they have clients from three sides: Pakistan, the West – and when I say the West I don’t mean Europe, except of course England – and India, to hit Pakistan… Basically people think you [foreigners/Westerners] have instructed and paid the Taleban to do these latest attacks.” (Internationals would be wise not to brush such views aside too lightly. The fact that they do not seem that outlandish to many of the Afghans we speak to, illustrates the ever widening gap in how this conflict is viewed).
The third concern is the concern of the government – or rather: the concentric rings formed first by the President, second his various entourages, and third the wider political elite of those who have allowed themselves to be coopted. It centres on the fear of being outshone and replaced by other persons or groups, who may manage to capture the favour of the increasingly impatient international community. It builds on the assumption that the internationals may one day pick a new leader or ally, if only they can be persuaded that this is in their interest. As a result, opposition discussions are being closely monitored and trusted advisers closely watched.
Critics of President Karzai – whether situated in the formal opposition or within government – are engaged in what you could call an ongoing low-level brainstorm, in which they evaluate whether and when it might be feasible to propose a new political set-up and how to secure international support for the effort. The open opposition – roughly centred around a few key figures, including former NDS chief Amrullah Saleh, former Foreign Minister Dr Abdullah and the more recent coalition made up of Mohaqeq, Dostum and Ahmad Zia Massoud – continues to be preoccupied by their efforts to forge a more united front. Although the uprisings in the Middle East and the symbolic appeal of the upcoming Bonn conference are providing a sense of both opportunity and urgency, so far discussions seem to get stuck in disagreements over who will be (or which group will provide) the main personality that all others are expected to rally around.
The stand-off between the President and Parliament, which is consistently being played down by the Palace, is closely linked to this precarious balance between the government and the opposition. It is a balance in which both sides try to check each other’s influence – without exaggerating and thus possibly provoking a rash reaction from the other side that they may not be able to contain. Every now and then the media singles out some of the rumour and posturing – state of emergency, impeachment,revolt – and reports on it, but for the moment the unraveling does not seem imminent.
* Circumstances suggest that the killing of Ahmad Wali Karzai was not an orchestrated affair, but rather an escalated personal argument over money or a family matter. This, however, becomes largely irrelevant in the context of conspiracy theories.
** The use of the word ‘foreigners’ is conveniently ambiguous, as it can cover both the regional neighbours, most prominently Pakistan, as well as the US-led international coalition, and suggests that secretive ‘hidden hands’ are at work. Although politicians and spokespersons may point the finger at foreigners while knowing better, either to deflect scrutiny or to arouse emotions, it does seem to increasingly resonate with what their audiences wonder.
Revisions:
This article was last updated on 9 Mar 2020
Tags:
assassinations
Hamid Karzai
Taleban
Transition
US
