Working Conditions of Local Civil Society in Afghanistan: Realities, Opportunities, and Challenges

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Heinrich Boell Foundation, January 2024

This report already published in early 2024 by the German foundation provides a highly necessary differentiated look into the diverse reality of Afghan civil society organisations under the second Taleban regime. The author writes that

The overall working conditions for local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and social groups have become incredibly difficult. Not only have more restrictions been put on these organiza- tions, but overall space for civic activism and engagement has shrunk.

But he also says that “this is not a monolithic picture.”

The dynamics between the de facto authorities and CSOs in Afghanistan vary, and are deeply influenced by geographic, cultural, religious, and historical factors.

Furthermore:

… urban CSOs advocating for democratic values or women’s and human rights principles often clash with the de facto authorities’ religious and rural-oriented perspectives, leading to greater resistance. These urban organizations struggle to establish networks, trust and strong relationships with the Taliban, who are predominantly from rural and religiously conservative backgrounds. The Taliban often mistrusts these CSOs due to their different outlook and a perceived agenda counter to Taliban’s values and positions. Meanwhile, Cs due to their views and mission statements often pre-emptively try to avoid the de facto authorities and might even refuse constructive engagement – not least because their benefactors and members are opposing the Taliban and its ideology.

(…)

At the other end of the spectrum, CSOs operating in rural areas under the Republic and working with rural elders or religious actors tend to have a slightly easier relationship with the de facto authorities.They tend to share similar religious and cultural backgrounds with the Taliban, and thus tend to have more effective communication and stronger relations- hips with them. They have had an easier transition from the Republic-era.These CSOs have generally been able to more effectively engage with the de facto authorities, often because they are advocating on the concerns of rural populations and issues that are less confrontational …

(…)

Despite these challenges, some urban CSOs are making modest headway with the de facto authorities. 

Under “Challenges for Future Engagement” he lists, besides “lack of funding”, “donor political positioning and objectives” and “political de-risking and reputational concerns that prevent international community mem- bers from funding Afghan CSOs. These concerns seem particularly counterintuitive and counterproductive considering that CSO engagement with the Taliban might be an effective approach to bringing about change over the longer term (and, arguably, more effective than international pressure).”